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Abstract—As the demand for cheaper electronic devices has
increased, the location of manufacturing foundries has changed,
sometimes to untrusted places in foreign countries. Some of
these locations have limited oversight of the manufacturing of
complicated and sensitive electronic components including integrated circuits (ICs). The integrated circuits are key component
in all current electronic devices and can be modified to be
malicious or to monitor the functions of their applications. These
malicious modifications on the ICs are called hardware trojans
(HWTs). HWTs can be designed to quietly monitor, to actively
send out sensitive information, or to destroy their host device
completely. The idea of hardware trojans in Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs) has not been investigated before; thus, our
goal is to demonstrate the potential threat that hardware trojans
pose for sensor networks. This is important to study, given that
in WSNs hundreds of sensors are deployed and in most cases
left unattended, which gives the opportunity to an attacker to
trigger a HWT on the sensors. For our investigation, we used
TelosB sensors that have been used for some WSN applications.
An attacker in a network can, for example, take advantage of the
SPI bus that is used by the radio to eavesdrop messages and even
disrupt communications completely. Currently, security breaches
through software is given great importance in the WSN academic
and research community. Our research shows that the same level
of importance must be given to attacks through hardware to
ensure a trusted and secure network.

KEY WORDS: WSN, hardware trojan, TelosB.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are being used widely for
different purposes such as military, health, and environmental
monitoring. In military applications, sensors are used for target
tracking, surveillance, intrusion detection, or identification
[1], [2]. Other applications are flood alerting system [3],
biomedical health monitoring and volcano monitoring [4], [5],
[6]. In these applications, a large number of sensors construct
a WSN. Each of these devices consists of a sensing unit,
processing unit, transceiver unit and a power unit. The sensing
unit includes different sensors such as light, temperature and
humidity. The processing section is for basic computational
tasks. The transceiver is the singular way for the sensors to
communicate with each other. As for the power unit, sensors
are equipped usually with small batteries.
Among the various features of WSNs, the rapid deployment,
self-organization and fault tolerance characteristics along with

the small size and low cost make them a highly effective
sensing facility to be utilized in different applications. In
WSNs, the number of the sensors that are deployed to monitor
an incident can reach thousands [7]. With this scale, loss of a
number of these sensors do not influence the operation of the
network and provides a level of fault tolerances to the network.
In some of these applications, the data collected by the
sensors is sensitive and private. For example, in target tracking
for the battlefields, data should be encrypted and submitted
securely to the end users using an encryption method. Here,
as the sensors are working with delicate information, any threat
to the functionality of the sensors can be critical. Some other
applications are dependent on timely delivery of the data. For
instance, in a fire detection sensor network for a forest, if there
is a fire, information that is collected by the sensors should be
received at the monitoring station in time for decision making
process. In such an application, if the data transmission is
interrupted or delayed, it may cause devastating consequences.
Some WSN applications require the sensors to be in proximity of the event. In these cases, sensors are designed to accomplish their tasks in unattended working areas. Examples of
such places include battlefields, large warehouses and forests.
Data that is gathered by the sensors in these applications can
be confidential or time sensitive. Thus, to guarantee the safety
of the sensors, security considerations must be addressed with
high priority.
There are different types of security attacks in the sensor
networks, including node replication attacks [8], DoS attacks
[9], attacks on the privacy of the network such as eavesdropping and passive monitoring [10], and many others. However,
as we will show in this paper, there is another security threat to
the safety of the sensor networks that has not been addressed
before.
In particular, we will describe the potential threat of Hardware Trojans (HWTs) in sensor networks. A HWT is a
deliberate modification of the hardware during the fabrication
process, with the intent to impose a major threat to the
functionality of the networks. This has been widely studied for traditional networks, but not yet considered in the
context of wireless sensor networks, where devices can be
left unattended. If a sensor device has been tampered by a
HWT, they can alter performance by corrupting data and/or
interrupting communication. Our paper focuses on establishing
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the feasibility of this type of threat in WSNs. It also serves to
encourage the community to address security measures starting
from the fabrication process of the sensors.
In order to demonstrate the threat of HWTs in a sensor
network, we have conducted multiple experiments using off
the shelf products. The experiments illustrate the potential
impact of HWTs on a sensor network comprising TelosB
sensors. We exhibit how an attacker can activate a HWT by
tampering with the TelosB hardware board. As we do not
have access to the fabrication process, our assumption is that
a HWT has been inserted in the sensor board.
This work is important due to the dearth of knowledge on
the subject. Currently, security breaches through software is
given great importance in the WSN academic and research
community. Our research shows that the same level of importance must be given to hardware based attacks to ensure a
trusted and secure environment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Background is
explained in Section 2. In Section 3, we go over the literature
review. Section 4 explains the system model and experiments.
Finally conclusion and future work are expressed in Section
5.
II. BACKGROUND
There are a number of obstacles that cause security concerns
to be different in WSN from the conventional networks.
Consequently, existing security techniques are not completely
adequate or applicable for the sensor networks. Some of these
obstacles are:
A. Limitations of WSNs
1) Restricted Resources: In order to apply a security
mechanism, a specified extent of hardware and software assets
must be available which include memory space and power
resources. But sensors that operate in WSNs are strictly limited
in terms of memory size and power consumption. For instance,
a typical sensor type like TelosB has 10KB of RAM memory
and it is powered by a small pack of batteries. Thus, the
security codes that are designed to be installed on a sensor
must be small in size. Energy constraint is another important
concern in WSNs. As the sensors are deployed in a network,
they are expected to operate for long duration of time and to
apply a security method for a sensor, the energy burden must
be taken into consideration.
2) Wireless Communication: The security of the network
relies heavily on a defined protocol, which in turn depends on
communication [11]. Considering the communication medium
for the majority of sensor networks is wireless, WSNs are
prone to security attacks. Packets that are submitted via
wireless channels are at risk of being dropped or damaged.
Also, when using wireless medium, there is a high risk of
collisions due to fact that all nodes broadcast on a shared
medium and in a highly condensed WSNs, failure of packet
submission is prevalent [12].

3) Unattended Operation: As mentioned earlier, based on
the type of the application that WSNs are used for, sensors
might be expected to operate in an unattended environment for
a long time. This means that the sensor nodes are exposed and
vulnerable to physical attacks. If the habitat is easily accessible, then an adversary can simply tamper with the devices.
In this situation, the likelihood that a sensor deteriorates is
much higher than devices deployed in secured network, like a
typical personal computer (PC) in a network.
As the WSN is a unique type of wireless network with
its own special limitations, the security requirements for
such a network are also different. In order to make data
communication safe, data must be encrypted and the secret
key should be accessible by the receiver only. If that is the
case, data confidentiality is attainable. However, even with the
implementation of data encryption, a sensor network is still
not safe completely. It is possible for an adversary to disturb
or destroy the sensors’ communication.
B. Hardware Trojans
The issue of trust is an emerging problem in integrated
circuit (IC) security [13]. High demand for reducing the costs
due to economic concerns, has pushed the ICs manufacturing
to offshore foundries. As a result, the control over the process
of IC fabrication has been reduced significantly and they
are more susceptible to malicious attacks by adversaries.
Schematics and plans are sent and we simply trust those
foundries to manufacture and deliver the desired product. This
leaves the IC fabrication process prone to hardware trojans.
HWTs are the malicious altering of hardware specifications
or implementation in such a way that its functionality can be
modified under a set of conditions defined by the attacker [14].
The set of conditions, are the triggering events that provoke
the HWT on the IC. Triggering the HWT can be performed in
different ways such as remotely or by direct physical access.
HWT can be enabled remotely, as the device is not physically
accessible, by a specific input event. The HWT could be
triggered by a particular sound or light pattern. In this case,
an adversary does not need to physically access the device,
but can trigger it remotely.
For example, a HWT can enforce the chip to leak out
information covertly in different ways such as optical, thermal
or radio. In optical type of HWT, a LED on the circuit is
electrically adjusted in a way that it blinks at a rate which
is indistinguishable by human eye. This optical signal can be
accessed using an optical to audio amplifier. Thermal trojans
cause an external resistor on the chip to emit heat. Different
parts of the chip, such as the microcontroller are saturated,
they will create thermal heat. An adversary can then receive
this thermal signal using an infrared camera [15].
If the attacker can get physical access to the device, he can
provoke the HWT directly. For instance, an attacker can use
a particular input string which is inserted via a less secured
section of the IC such as unused input pin.
Most of the testing methods for HWT detection assume the
existence of a golden IC that is obtained through a complete

testing process of a random selected IC. The IC that has been
completely cleared from validation tests will be called the
golden IC [16]. After obtaining the golden IC, it will be the
trusted resource for checking the other ICs. The mechanism
of attaining the golden IC is hard, complicated and it needs
professional and expensive testing tools. In case of WSNs,
since some of the sensor networks are less secured, it is
possible for an adversary to activate a HWT on the sensors.
That is, an attacker can gain control of the sensors after
deployment in the network and activate the HWT. Thus the
threat of the HWTs in wireless sensor networks must be
addressed. Considering we do not have the proper accessories
to test our TelosB sensors, we can not verify if the sensor
is carrying a HWT or not. Thus, for the purpose of our
experiments, we assume that our sensors are contaminated
with the HWTs.
Let us consider the case that sensors are manufactured in
an untrusted factory in a foreign country and due to lack of
supervision in the fabrication process HWT has been inserted
to the sensors. These HWTs are extremely hard to detect as
they are designed to escape validation tests and would still
be able to destroy the chip or leak sensitive information [17].
Later these infected sensors will be cleared from validation
tests and they will be ready to be spread out in the network
to accumulate data from the environment. If the desired
sensor network is not highly secured and sensors will be left
unattended in the sensing area, it is possible for an adversary
to get physical access to the sensors and activate the HWT on
the sensors which can cause major effect on the functionality
of the sensor. For example, sensors can be deployed in the
battlefields for target tracking. Thus, the information that is
gathered by the sensors is sensitive and must be delivered on
time to the base station. An adversary can activate the HWT
on the sensors to stop them from transmitting the data or to
destroy them completely.
III. L ITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we review some previous works on the
security attacks in WSNs. Also, due to the importance of
HWT, we review the current works in this area. Sensor
networks are vulnerable to different types of security attacks
because of their distributed nature and their deployment in
hard to access environments. These threats can make a huge
effect on the functionality of WSNs. According to [9], some
of the major security attacks in WSNs are:
1) Attacks on secrecy and authentication: These attacks
target the standard cryptographic techniques that protect the
secrecy and authenticity of sensors’ communication. Attacks
under this category include node replication attack and attacks
on privacy such as eavesdropping and passive monitoring.
Parno et al. [8] investigated node replication attack in which
the attacker tries to insert a node to the sensor network by
copying or replication of the node identifier. Authors designed
algorithms for distributed node-replica detection.
Eavesdropping and passive monitoring is one most common
attacks on the privacy of the data in the sensor network. If

the information is not encrypted well, an adversary in the
network can eavesdrop the message. Dai et al. [10] proposed
a model to inspect the probability of the eavesdropping in
single hop and multihop sensor networks. They found that
using directional antennas in these networks can reduce the
eavesdropping chance significantly.
2) Attacks on network availability: These type of attacks
are often called denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks
can affect different layer of the network. One type of DoS
attacks in the physical layer is the jamming attack. It interferes
with the radio frequency of the nodes in the network [9], [18].
For the network layer, some of the attacks include sinkhole
[19] and sybil [20].
There are other works on the security attacks in WSNs [21]–
[23], but as far as our knowledge, the idea of HWT threat in
wireless sensor networks has not been investigated before.
As the concerns about the HWTs has increased due to
extensive outsourcing of the IC manufacturing process to
untrusted foundries, many researchers have worked on the
topic of HWTs.
Wang et al. [24] provided one of the first exhaustive studies
on the topic of hardware trojans. They investigated different possibilities for malicious tampering of ICs. Also, they
proposed a framework to classify different types of HWTs.
Moreover, they examined some HWT detection methods for
most eminent types of hardware trojans.
A specific class of HWTs which is called Trojan side
channels (TSC) was introduced by Lin et al. [25]. They devised
a new type of hardware trojan, which is responsible for developing artificial power side-channels. TSCs are appropriate
to secretly leak private information. They can submit the data
using side channel signals. An attacker who has implemented
the TSC can receive and decode the information.
There are other works in the literature focused on HWT
implementation and detection [26], [27], [28]. Reviewing
previous works on the security attacks in sensor networks and
the research on the HWT, makes it clear that HWTs threats
have been addressed and investigated for different types of ICs
but none of the existing works address the threat of hardware
trojans for the sensor devices in WSNs. Thus, in this paper
for the first time we investigate the feasibility of the HWTs in
the sensor networks.
IV. S YSTEM M ODEL AND E XPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe the system model and the
particular experiments that we have conducted.
A. System Model
We consider a system including TelosB sensors as the
network and an attacker device to play the role of an adversary
who tries to infiltrate the network by activating a HWT on a
sensor. TelosB or Tmote Sky sensor is an ultra low power wireless module for use in monitoring applications [29]. Chipcon
CC2420 radio is embedded for wireless communications on
the TelosB. The radio communication is controlled by the TI
MSP430 microcontroller through the SPI bus.

Fig. 1. MSP430 Block Diagram.

Serial Peripheral Interface or SPI is a simple 4-wire serial
bus interface that is used mainly by the microcontroller to
establish communication with peripheral devices. In a SPI
communication, there is always a master and one or more slave
devices. The master is the one that starts the communication
and controls the communication. Once the communication is
established, data can be transmitted from both sides, as the
connection is full-duplex. The standard SPI protocol has 4
signal wires: MOSI, MISO, SCK and SS. In Figure 1, the
block diagram of the MSP430 on TelosB and its connection
to peripherals is shown. Another device that we used in our
experiments is the Arduino, which is a microcontroller board
based on the ATmega328 [30].
B. System Implementation
To prove our concept of view, we deployed a sensor network
and we tried to demonstrate what will happen if an attacker
can tamper with the sensors which we assumed carry a HWT.
We implemented a system consisting the TelosB sensors and
an attacker device. This attacker is used to prompt the HWT
on the sensors in the network. It should be mentioned that
as we do not have tools to validate if the sensors have been
contaminated with the HWT, we create a similar scenario. That
is, we attempt to destroy the functionality of the sensors and
make them behave in abnormal way which is equivalent to
activating the presumed HWT. As we explained earlier, when
a HWT is activated on a device, it forces the system to show
unusual behavior. To implement our idea, we investigated
different methods to find a way to breach the sensor hardware.
The radio is the only communication method for the wireless sensors. Our goal was to disable the radio communication
of the TelosB. We focused on interrupting the radio communication of the sensors by exploiting the SPI bus on the sensor.
As depicted in the Figure 1, the USART0 on the MSP430
provides the SPI bus functionality for the TelosB sensor. When
the sensor wants to transmit data via radio, the SPI bus will
be used. Also, if the sensor wants to establish communication
with a peripheral device, this will happen through the SPI bus.

Thus, SPI is used for two purposes on the TelosB, which
should not interfere with each other. It means that when the
TelosB is communicating with other sensors, it should not
be able to make SPI communication with another device.
Otherwise, the radio communication will be interrupted and
the sensor that is supposed to transmit information can not
send or receive data. Also, if the data is transferred over the
SPI bus, it should be protected via encryption so an adversary
can not sniff the data packet during radio communication of
the sensors in the network.
We exploited the SPI bus to interrupt the normal functionality of the sensor and make it behave viciously which is similar
to the case that a real HWT is activated on the sensor by an
attacker who has physical access to the sensor.
A group of TelosB sensors constitute the WSN. To get the
sensors to be actively sending and receiving messages over
the radio, they run an application called RadioCountToLeds.
In this application, each mote will act as a 4Hz counter that
broadcasts its counter value each time that it gets updated.
The other node that receives a value as a packet, displays
the number of the counter on its LEDs. In this scenario,
radio chips of the sensors are actively involved as the wireless
communication between the TelosBs is running via radio.
Our goal is to break off the radio communication between
the sensors by using an attacker device. This is done via
exploiting the SPI bus of the TelosB. If the attacker can disrupt
the communication of the sensors and make them behave in
abnormal way, we can prove our concept that it is possible
to activate the HWT on the sensors in the field. To stop
the sensor from transmitting data, we have to find a way
to the disable the SPI communication between the CC2420
(radio) and MSP430 (microcontroller). This is because on the
TelosB radio communication is controlled by MSP430. We use
the attacker to demolish the SPI communication between the
CC2420 and MSP430. By use of the attacker we can generate
a source, which is a signal, to manipulate the SPI bus.
C. Experiments
We have conducted different types of experiments. The
common base in all of these experiments is the use of the
Arduino as the attacker device. The difference between the
models is the way that we generate the fake source to interrupt
radio communication of the sensors.
For the first experiment, our goal is to break the sensors’ communication by using a specific sequence of binary
numbers. In the second attempt, we exploit a PIR sensor to
disturb the TelosBs’ transmission. As another method for the
attack, we use Morse code to be able to submit meaningful
patterns. Morse code is a communication method in which the
text information will be transmitted as tones, lights, or clicks
in an on-off pattern. The message can be understood by a
professional listener without any special equipment.
Binary pattern, PIR sensor, or Morse code, if they will
be applied directly to the different pins on the TelosB such
as MSP430 microcontroller (MCU) pins, they will not be
sufficient without exploiting the SPI bus. Thus, we establish

Fig. 2. TelosB U2 expansion header.

SPI communication between the Arduino as a peripheral
device and TelosB.
Arduino which is used as the basic part of the attacker
system, is designed with 14 pins as digital input/output. Each
of these pins can be used either as input or output. Some of
the pins also provide special functions. For SPI communication
with other devices via the SPI library the following pins are
used:
• 10 (SS- Slave Select) - The master uses to enable/disable
Slave,
• 11 (MOSI- Master Out Slave In) - Sending data to the
peripherals,
• 12 (MISO- Master In Slave Out) - Sending data to the
master,
• 13 (SCK - Serial Clock) - Synchronizes data transmission
and is generated by the master.
On the TelosB, three wires of the SPI 4-Wire bus are
accessible via U2 expansion header on the TelosB board which
is depicted in Figure 2. These are SS, MOSI and SCL. The last
SPI pin will be directly attached to MISO pin on the MCU.
It should be noted that since our goal is to break the radio
communication, we do not need to transfer data on MISO
from the TelosB to the Arduino. That is, there will be no data
sent from slave which is the telosB to the master which is
Arduino.
In all of the following experiments, it is the responsibility of
the Arduino device to establish the SPI communication with
TelosB and transfer the signal, that is generated by different
sources, to the sensor which in turn triggers the TelosB to stop
its normal operation.
1) Attack using a Binary pattern: In the first experiment,
we generate a binary pattern to be transmitted on MOSI line
from the master that is Arduino to the slave TelosB. In parallel,
sensors in the network have their normal operation which can
be seen as the LEDs of the sensors are broadcasting the current
amount of their counter.
The SPI communication is formed between one of the
sensors and Arduino. Data on the MOSI line will be used to
trigger and stop the radio communication between the sensors.
When the current bit in the binary sequence is equal to one,
we enable the SPI connection. This input will be carried over

the SPI data line MOSI. As soon as the data is received by
the MOSI line on the TelosB, radio communication of the
sensors will be stopped and LEDs will stop blinking. When
the current data in binary pattern equals to zero, it will cause
the SPI communication to be terminated and sensors would
resume radio transmission.
Also, to better visualize the current value of the binary
pattern, we use a red LED that is connected to the Arduino
to display the current value of the binary pattern. The system implementation via Fritzing software [31] is depicted in
Figure 3.
In this experiment, by the use of the Arduino as the attacker
device we transferred a binary pattern to stop the normal
operation of the sensor network. We tried to create a similar
case to the scenario of the real application. In that case, if the
sensors, which are contaminated by the HWT are deployed
in an unattended area, a malicious adversary can get access
to the sensors and uses an attacker device to submit a binary
pattern to activate the trojan on the sensor and destroy the
routine operation of the network.
2) Attack using PIR sensor: For the second experiment,
we used a PIR sensor that is assembled on the Arduino board.
PIR (Passive Infrared) sensor is used to detect a human target
that has moved in or out of the sensor range. Every object
emits some low level of radiation and the hotter something is,
the more radiation is emitted. A PIR sensor is able to detect
levels of infrared radiation. When a PIR detects motion in its
range, its output pin will be ”high”.
As we have programmed our system, whenever the PIR
sensor detects a motion in its proximity, a high signal will
be generated as its output. Using the SPI bus, we transfer this
signal on the MOSI line to the TelosB. System implementation
is depicted in Figure 4.
On the Arduino, we also use a red LED to visualize the
output pin of the PIR sensor, when the output is high, the red
LED turns on. In the absence of movement around the PIR
sensor, the TelosBs have their radio communication. When
an activity is detected around the PIR, the communication of
the sensors will be stopped, which we can easily see as the
LEDs on the sensors will stop working. By disabling the SPI
communication, sensors will resume their normal operation.
If the attacker establishes the SPI communication with one
of the sensor boards, and keeps it active, the network can be
disrupted frequently based on the output of the PIR sensor.
Similar to the previous section, we can consider this experiment for the real application. The adversary can design
an attacker system that will be sensitive to movement in its
surrounding area. Any motion can trigger this attacker which
in turn can cause the HWT on the sensor to be activated.
3) Attack using Morse code pattern: In this test, we want
to create a text message to break the sensors’ communication.
For our purpose we use the Morse code. As mentioned earlier,
text information can be transmitted as sequences of on-off
tones, lights, or clicks. A skilled receiver can understand the
message without using any tools.
Here, we design our algorithm’s Morse section to receive

Fig. 3. Attacker using binary pattern.

Fig. 4. System Diagram with PIR.

any form of text messages from the user via serial port of
the Arduino. That is, the attacker can enter different text
messages to be transmitted by SPI bus for disrupting the
sensors’ communication. The Morse code works as follows:
When a text message is received via the algorithm, each
letter is represented using a series of dots and dashes. These
two terms are used to represent short and long signals. There
are a number of international rules for sending Morse code.
The duration of a dash signal is three times the duration of a
dot signal. Each of these signals will be followed by a short
duration of silence which is equal to the time of one dot
signal. The letters of a word in the text are separated using a
space that is same as three dots. The words of a sentences are
spaced by seven dots. The duration of one dot signal is used
to represent unit of time measurement. The representation of

English alphabet and numbers in Morse code is shown in
Figure 5. For instance, the word trojan will be represented as:

T-

R .-.

O---

J .- - -

A .-

N -.

To make it easier to understand, we demonstrate the output
of the Morse code on a LED that is attached to the Arduino.
Before the attacker enters a text on the serial terminal of the
Arduino, the sensors have the normal radio communication.
But as soon as the attacker enters a text, it will be translated
to Morse code and will be transferred via SPI communication;
as the result, the sensors’ communication will be stopped and
LEDs on the sensors do not blink anymore. The TelosBs’
communication would resume only after the physical reset
button on the sensors will be pushed. The attacker can enter

Fig. 5. International Morse code.

any combination of text or numbers as the input to the Morse
code and via the SPI bus, this can be used to interrupt the
sensors’ communication. In the real application of sensor
network, the adversary can design the attacker device to act
on a specific Morse Code. For instance, he can use start and
stop as the inputs to the Morse code system to activate or
deactivate the hardware trojan on the sensors.
As can be seen through the experiments that we have
conducted, by exploiting the SPI bus on the sensors, it
seems that a backdoor to the network is provided for the
attackers which can be used the engage the sensors to act
maliciously. If such a backdoor is provided for the attackers,
they can implement even more complicated attacks to affect
the sensors’ functionality in much more severe ways or extend
the number of malicious sensors to a larger amount in the
network. Considering the limitations of the sensors in terms
of computation resources and longevity, attackers may not
need complex tools to manipulate the unattended sensors and
activate the embedded hardware trojan.
V. C ONCLUSION AND F UTURE W ORK
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been used in many
applications such as remote environmental monitoring and
target tracking. They are deployed in the network for a long
duration of time. In some of the applications of the WSNs,
sensors are left unattended in the network. Thus, it is possible
that an adversary in the network can get physical access to the
sensors and makes some malicious changes.
To reduce the cost of fabricating ICs, the manufacturing
process has been shifted to untrusted foundries. As a consequence, ICs are more exposed to malicious changes in the
harware which is called hardware trojan and could have huge
effect on their functionality. HWTs are designed to be able
to escape validation test and later when the IC is in use, an
adversary can find a way to activate the HWT to engage the
device to act in a malicious way.
In this work, our goal was to explain that the feasibility of
the HWT threat in the sensor network should be taken into
consideration as sensors of a WSN are potential candidates
for insertion of the HWT in the fabrication process. When the
infected sensors are deployed in the field to collect data, an

adversary can activate the HWT on these sensors to destroy
the network.
As HWTs are extremely hard to detect and we did not have
access to the special devices that are used for hardware trojan
detection in our experiments, we assumed that our sensors
have been contaminated with HWT and we tried to find a way
to make the sensors behave in an abnormal way. For the TelosB
sensors, we employed the SPI bus on the sensors and we
showed that an attacker can use this weak point as a backdoor
to disrupt the normal operation of the sensors which can be
considered as triggering the HWT. Through our experiments,
we used different methods to generate the triggering source
for breaking into the TelosB.
As the result of our experiments we were able to validate
that an adversary can activate a HWT on the TelosB sensors.
This was one approach for investigating the threat of hardware
trojans in WSNs. We believe as the sensor networks are good
candidates for implementing HWTs, specific security mechanism should be designed to better identify these hardware
trojans in WSNs.
We aim to raise awareness of the other researchers to the
potential threat that hardware trojans can cause for the sensor
networks. We believe this work can be considered as the first
step towards addressing and investigating this important threat
in more details.
The primary goal for our future work is to design a
HWT detection and defense mechanism that can be easily
implemented and integrated in the sensor. A possible solution
can be done via software using a framework like Di-Sec [32]
that allows monitoring of the sensing components to identify
malicious activities and also facilitates the implementation of
a defense technique.
R EFERENCES
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